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THE PROBLEM OF CORPORATE GROUPS, A
COMMENT ON PROFESSOR ZIEGEL
Robert K. Rasmussen*
Professor Ziegel's article provides a helpful guide to some of
the issues that may arise in the insolvency of a corporate group that
spans the United States and Canada.' There is much to learn from
the piece. Professor Ziegel provides an insightful analysis of two
types of problems that arise when an enterprise that has substantial
operations in both the United States and Canada seeks relief under
each nation's respective bankruptcy laws.2 The legal organization
can be arranged so that it will be many affiliated entities in each
jurisdiction.
Few, if any, enterprises that have substantial
operations in two countries will have all of its assets housed in a
single legal entity. This is true regardless of how tightly integrated
the firm's operations are. In short, transnational firms are
corporate groups.
The first, and somewhat easier, set of problems that Professor
Ziegel examines revolves around whether all members of the
corporate group can file for bankruptcy in the appropriate national
forum. If one assumes that the corporate group as a whole needs
to be reorganized, Canada's somewhat more stringent requirement
to file for reorganization raises the possibility that some members
of the group could be left outside of the reorganization effort." The
fear is that failure to administer all of the assets of the enterprise
" Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Vanderbilt
Law
School.
1.

See Jacob S. Ziegel, Corporate Groups and Crossborder Insolvencies: A

Canada- United States Perspective, 7 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 367 (2002).
2. See infra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
3. Ziegel, supra note 1, at 375-77.
4. See id. at 376-77 The assumption that all legal entities need to be part of
the restructuring is probably not valid for all corporate groups. See Robert K.
Rasmussen, A New Approach to TransnationalInsolvencies, 19 MICH. J. INT'L. L.
1, 28-29 (1997).
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could impede, and perhaps doom, the reorganization effort.
The second, and more difficult, set of issues that Professor
Ziegel focuses on arise once at least part of the corporate group
has come within the jurisdiction of both countries' bankruptcy
courts Inevitably, not all creditors will find themselves similarly
situated. To be sure, there will be the commonplace difference
between secured creditors and unsecured creditors. But corporate
groups raise an additional problem. Even creditors whose claims
have the same ostensible priority position may be facing the
prospect of receiving radically different payouts.6 For example,
creditors of one member of the corporate group may have claims
that in total roughly equal that member's assets. Such creditors
face the happy fate of being paid in full. Creditors of another
related entity, however, may have claims that vastly exceed the
assets of that member. These creditors see the possibility of a
return of pennies on the dollar. The latter group of creditors
understandably would prefer to see all claims and assets of the
corporate group lumped together, whereas the former group of
creditors would insist on maintaining the legal separation among
the affiliated entities. The question, in a nutshell, is to what extent
should the courts respect the divisions made by the parties? This
problem arises even in the context of a wholly domestic firm.7 The
problem only becomes compounded when competing legal systems
struggle with the issue.
These problems are nettlesome. Professor Ziegel does an
admirable job in setting forth the issues that a court, guided only by
the common law, will face. In this comment, I want to make two
brief points to help put these issues into context. Both points stem
5. Id. at 376-80.
6. See generally Ziegel, supra note 1, at 381-82 (outlining the priority
distribution issues that arise when the assets and liabilities among members of the
group are intermingled that substantive consolidation becomes unavoidable).
7. The classic domestic treatment of this issue remains the exchange
between then Professors Landers and Posner. See Jonathan M. Landers, A
Unified Approach to Parent,Subsidiary, and Affiliate Questions in Bankruptcy, 42
U. CHI. L. REv. 589 (1975); see also Richard A. Posner, The Rights of Creditors
of Affiliated Corporations,43 U. CHI. L. REv. 499 (1976); Jonathan M. Landers,
Another Word on Parents, Subsidiaries,and Affiliates in Bankruptcy, 43 U. CHI.
L. REv. 527 (1976).

20021

COMMENT ON PROFESSOR ZIEGEL

from the fact that in modern financial practice, a firm's
organizational structure, and by this I mean the number of distinct
legal entities that comprise the corporate ground and the assets
and obligations of each entity result from a conscious decision of
the firm's managers. Moreover, sophisticated creditors are well
aware of these decisions when they extend credit. The first point,
which is noted in passing by Professor Ziegel, is that not all related
entities of a group file for insolvency.8 Bankruptcy of an enterprise
does not imply that all of the assets will come before the
bankruptcy court. This ability of the firm's managers and creditors
to ensure that some assets remain beyond the reach of any
bankruptcy court suggests hesitancy on imposing substantive
consolidation on unwilling parties.
The second, and more
important, point is that creditors are increasingly adroit at
structuring their transactions to ensure that asset allocation
decisions rest with those with the largest economic stake in the
enterprise. The point here is that creditors contract over both
control right and cash flow rights. An approach to transnational
insolvency that proceeds from the premise that coordination
among bankruptcy courts is necessary to ensure that a firm's assets
are put to their highest valued use rests uneasily with the increasing
sophistication of financial contracting.
Professor Ziegel notes that when a corporate group files for
insolvency both in the United States and Canada, it is not
inevitable that all members of the group will be put into the
bankruptcy proceeding.9 For example, when the Loewen Group, a
chain of funeral homes that took on more debt than it could
service,"0 filed for reorganization in both the United States and
Canada, roughly 200 of its 1100 affiliates remained outside of
bankruptcy." Similarly, in the recent Enron bankruptcy, only
8. See generally Ziegel, supra note 1, at 387-88.
9. Id. at 382.
10. On the formation and growth of the Loewen Group, see STUART C.
GILSON, CREATING VALUE THROUGH CORPORATE RESTRUCrURING: CASE
STUDIES IN BANKRUPTCIES, BUYOUTS, AND BREAKUPS 25-53 (2001). For a
discussion of the enterprise's bankruptcy proceedings, see Charles S. Elson,
VAND. L. REv. (forthcoming Fall 2002).
11. See Motion for Joint Administration, In re Loewen Group Int'l., Inc., No.
99-1244, 2002 U.S. Bankr. LEXIS 199 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 19, 2002). For a
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fifteen entities of its more than 3,500 subsidiaries filed bankruptcy
petitions.'2 When it comes to corporate groups, bankruptcy is not
an all or nothing affair. Some entities go in; some stay out.
One obvious reason as to why all affiliated entities do not file
for bankruptcy is the increasing use of special purpose vehicles
("SPVs") in structured finance. 3 In a securitization transaction, a
firm transfers assets that it owns to an SPV. The SPV in turn, pays
the firm for the assets that it receives. The money for the assets
comes from selling notes issued by the SPV in the capital markets.
A key attribute of a SPV is that it is bankruptcy remote. It is
legally set up so that it will stay out of bankruptcy should the firm
from which it bought the assets file for bankruptcy. Indeed, the
whole point of the transaction is that this part of the corporate
group will not file for bankruptcy should the firm encounter
financial distress.
The fact that an enterprise can adopt a legal structure to
ensure that some assets remain outside of bankruptcy implies that
bankruptcy courts in both the United States and Canada should
not be quick to reach for the doctrine of substantive consolidation.
Corporate boundaries are no accident. They are increasingly
designed to match creditor claims with certain assets. To be sure,
while some are done as part of structured financing arrangements,
one can partition assets for other purposes as well. The central
point here is that whether or not a creditor ends up pursuing a
claim in bankruptcy is more and more a matter of choice made at
the time it lends money. A robust doctrine of substantive
consolidation that forced the mingling of assets within a court's
jurisdiction could create an additional incentive to ensure that
assets never entered the bankruptcy forum in the first instance. If
discussion of the Enron bankruptcy, see Douglas G. Baird & Robert K.
Rasmussen, The Four (or Five) Easy Lessons from Enron, VAND. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2002).
12. For a discussion of the Enron case, see Baird & Rasmussen, supra note
11.
13. For explanations of securitized transactions including SPVs, see generally
STEVEN SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE: A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF
ASSET SECURITIZATION (2d ed. 1993); Steven Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset
Securitization, 1 STAN. J. L. Bus. & FIN., 133, 135, 150-51 (1994); Claire Hill,
Securitization:A Low-Cost Sweetener for Lemons, 74 WASH U. L.Q. 1061 (1996).
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creditors could not rely on the fact that, for the purpose of
determining payouts in bankruptcy, legal distinctions would not
remain in place, they would be more likely to insist that the entity
to which they extend credit is bankruptcy remote.
Put somewhat differently, there is no preordained legal
structure of an enterprise. The same economic activity could, as a
legal matter, be housed in a single firm, a parent with a bunch of
subsidiaries or a host of related entities. Legal notions of what a
"firm" consists of simply have no unbreakable tether to economic
reality. You may have two legally distinct firms the assets of which
reside in what may economically be viewed as a single firm. The
only reason for the legal existence of two firms rather than one
may be to assign particular creditors to particular assets. This
distinction between the legal definition of the firm and an
economic conception of the firm explains why it can often be the
case that a firm leaves bankruptcy with many fewer subsidiaries
than it had when it entered bankruptcy. The assets may have
remained the same; they are simply in a different legal
configuration.14
The question of substantive consolidation is whether or not to
ignore the partition that the parties adopted. A court has no power
to ignore such partitioning to the extent that carved out assets
remain outside of bankruptcy. 5 This being the case, bankruptcy
courts should be hesitant to obliterate carefully designed partitions
inside of bankruptcy. To be sure, as Professor Ziegel notes,
substantive consolidation is warranted where the creditors all agree
it is in their economic interests. 6 In some situations, the cost of
keeping the legal entities distinct while running the bankruptcy
14. It is also the case that some of the assets may have been sold during the
reorganization proceeding. On the tendency to sell assets in reorganization, see
Lynn LoPucki & William Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity's Share in the
Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L.
REV. 125 (1990). Still the dramatic reduction in the number of subsidiaries
reported by Professor Ziegel most likely can be explained in large part by the
redrawing of the legal lines around the enterprise's assets.
15.

PHILIP J. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GRouPs: BANKRUPTCY

LAW § 18.02, at 417-18 (1985) (providing a review of corporate substantive
consolidation in bankruptcy).
16. Ziegel, supra note 1, at 385-86.
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proceedings may be such that every creditor is better off if the
assets and claims are simply lumped together. A decision by all the
creditors to go this route resembles contract modification, which is
generally thought to be unobjectionable. When, however, some
creditors find it in their interest to maintain the legal separation for
which they contracted, a bankruptcy court should be very reluctant
to disregard the structure that the parties have adopted.
The increased attention that parties have given to the
possibility of bankruptcy when they structure the lending
relationship, however, has broader implications than the doctrine
of substantive consolidation. Substantive consolidation is, by
definition, a sorting out of which claims go against which assets."
The more important question, at least from a general welfare
perspective, is how these assets will be deployed. As a first order
of proposition, the aggregate wealth of society is affected more by
how the assets are deployed rather than how ownership claims are
divvied up. In short, the size of the pie is more important than the
size of the slices. Or, in the language of modern finance, control
rights have a bigger societal impact than do priority rights. 8
Control rights are important because, at least implicitly, they
have been at the heart of the argument for a transnational
insolvency system that coordinated the actions of various domestic
bankruptcy courts. For over one hundred years, academics have
pined for a system to handle transnational insolvencies. 9 These
17. For a general review of substantive consolidation in bankruptcy, see Lisa
Poulin, Last in Line, PracticalBusiness Guidelines for Dealing with Substantive
Consolidation, 1998 A.B.I. J. LEXIS 282 (1998) (providing a review of the
problems creditors can face in substantive consolidation); Ulrik Bang-Pederson,
Asset Distribution in Transnational Insolvencies: Combining Predictability and
Protectionof Local Interests, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 385, 419-20 (1999) (describing
the structure of substantive consolidation in bankruptcy).
18. See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Control Rights, Priority
Rights, and the Conceptual Foundationsof Corporate Reorganizations,87 VA. L.
REV. 921 (2001).
19. See John Lowell, Conflict of Laws as Applied to Assignments for
Creditors,1 HARV. L. REv. 259, 264 (1888); see also Melissa K.S. Alwang, Annual
Survey Issue: International Insolvencies: Note: Steering the Most Appropriate
Course Between Admiralty and Insolvency: Why an International Insolvency
Treaty Should Recognize the Primacy of Admiralty Law Over Maritime Law, 64
FORDHAM L. REv. 2613, 2613 (1996); Claudia Tobler, Managing Failure in the
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self-styled universalists often predicate their argument on the need
to ensure that a single court is given an opportunity to orchestrate
a sensible allocation of an enterprises assets. They posit that
absent a coordinated proceeding, there will be a tendency toward
inefficient liquidations. The core notion is that if countries were to
operate their insolvency proceedings independently of each other,
creditors in each country, seeking to maximize their own payoffs,
will focus only on the entity against which they will have a claim,
and will forego working with the creditors of other members of the
group. This lack of coordination could lead to a failure to preserve
the synergy that may exist among the various group members who
inhabit different nations. Enterprises that have a going concern
surplus will be forced to close their doors because each bankruptcy
within each country will focus single-mindedly on the assets within
its national borders.'
The problem with this argument is that one cannot conclude
that there must be a single proceeding to resolve financial distress
from the fact that a corporate group spans more than one country.
The individual entities in each country are already protected by the
applicable bankruptcy regime of that country. To the extent that
there is a going concern surplus attributable to the assets in a single
country, domestic law responds to this concern. It may well be that
there is no going concern surplus attributable to the interactions
between the assets in one country and the assets in the other. For
some firms, administering assets separately may bring larger
returns to the firm's owners than would a single, transnational
insolvency proceeding. There is no normative reason to assume
that a priori various entities across borders have a greater value
when put under a single control structure. Indeed, we live in a
world where the cost of contracting is decreasing. The ability to
New Global Economy: The U.N.C.I.T.R.A.L. Model Law on Cross-Border
Insolvency, 22 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 383, 396; Andrew T. Guzman,
Internal Bankruptcy: In Defense of Universalism,98 MIcH. L. REv. 2177, 2178 n.4
(2000) (providing numerous sources which advocate universalism to address
transnational insolvencies); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Global Solution to
MultinationalDefaults, 98 MIcH. L. REV. 2276 (2000).
20. For a more detailed description of this argument, and a critique, see
Rasmussen, supra note 4; Robert K. Rasmussen, Resolving International
Bankruptcy Law Through Private Ordering,98 MICH. L. REv. 2252 (2000).
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recreate the functions of a firm via contract puts a cap on any
potential going concern surplus.
The crucial question in modern bankruptcy law is who makes
the asset allocation decision. 2' In firms free from financial distress,
control rights tend to be exercised by the board of directors. The
board decides who runs the firm on a day-to-day basis, and the
board must approve all major transactions that the firm makes.22
How these control rights should be exercised when the firm
becomes insolvent has been the subject of debate.' Traditionally,
academics in the area of transnational insolvency have focused on
ex-post solutions to this problem. 2 4 They have assumed that
coordination was needed to prevent inefficient liquidations.
Bankruptcy courts had to work together to ensure that the correct
decision was made.25
The increasing use of capital structures crafted with insolvency
in mind, such as special purpose vehicles that are bankruptcy
remote, suggests a different solution to the problem. Increasingly,
control rights are allocated on a state contingent basis. The debtor
and its creditors structure their affairs so that those whose money is
at stake are the ones making the crucial decisions.26 They may put
some assets in a corporate form to ensure that they never come
before a bankruptcy court. Lending agreements can be crafted so
that the firm can only continue to get working capital with the
blessings of its creditors. Venture capital contracts may give the
venture capitalist the power to terminate the enterprise when
things are not going well. Indeed, bankruptcy practice in the
United States has changed radically over the last ten years, in large
part because sophisticated parties have learned to craft contracts
21.
22.

See Baird & Rasmussen, Control Rights, supra note 18.
See generally JOHN CARVER & MIRIAM M. CARVER, YOUR ROLES AND
RESPONSIBILITIES AS A BOARD MEMBER, VOL. 2 (1996) (providing an

explanation of the general duties of a corporate board of directors).
23. See infra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
24. See generally sources cited, supra note 19.
25. For an extended discussion of going concern surplus and its relationship
to bankruptcy law, see Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of
Bankruptcy (unpublished draft, on file with the Fordham Journal of Corporate &
Financial Law).
26. See id.
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with an eye toward what will happen should the firm hit hard
times. American bankruptcy courts today are less likely to decide
how assets should be used than they were a decade ago.
This change in domestic bankruptcy practice suggests a shift in
for transnational insolvencies. While this comment
aspirations
our
is not the place for a sustained treatment of the issue, let me offer a
few general thoughts on how the problem of transnational
insolvencies should be approached through the lens of control
rights. Rather than seeking solutions that lead to coordinated
proceedings, we should strive to have proceedings that do not
interfere with the parties' allocation of control rights. If parties
have jiggered their corporate structure so that some entities in the
corporate group remain outside of bankruptcy, courts should not
attempt to revisit that decision. Similarly, if they have structured
their affairs so that the assets in the respective countries can be
administered separately, little is to be gained by trying to
coordinate the proceedings. We should only have coordinated
proceedings when the parties have structured control of the
enterprise in a way designed to benefit from coordinated, as
opposed to separate, insolvency proceedings.
While there has yet to be any systematic work done on the
question, it may well be that the lesson of respecting control right
allocations matters less for United States-Canadian insolvencies
than for other transnational insolvencies. The role that a country's
bankruptcy law plays in the allocation of control rights cannot be
isolated from the effects of the country's general corporate law.'
The two work together to support any given country's system of
corporate governance." The risk created by a world in which
transnational insolvencies would be handled by a single jurisdiction
would be that there could be a mismatch between corporate law
It is precisely where legal regimes differ
and bankruptcy.
significantly that the parties have an incentive to ensure each entity
is handled by the appropriate legal system. The risk of having a
bankruptcy law that is out of sync with the general corporate law
that governs a firm's activity, however, is relatively low in the
27. See David A. Skeel, Jr., An Evolutionary Theory of Corporate Law and
Corporate Bankruptcy, 51 VAND. L. REv. 1325 (1998).
28. See generally id.
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United States-Canada situation. The United States and Canadian
bankruptcy laws are functionally similar.29 This implies that
putting, say, American bankruptcy law on top of general Canadian
corporate law runs little risk of upsetting settled expectations. In
such a situation, a debtor and its creditors may implement a
financial structure that would best be handled through a
coordinated proceeding.
Consider, for example, the outcome of the Loewen Group
case.3" The trend in the funeral industry is toward consolidation."
It thus may make a good deal of sense to ensure that the enterprise
is administered as a single entity, which is what in fact happened in
the case.32 In the Loewen Group, the Canadian and American
bankruptcy courts agreed to cooperate, with the United States
Bankruptcy Court taking the lead.33 What is interesting is the way
in which the United States Bankruptcy Court acted.34 The Court,
rather than deciding how to deploy the assets of the Loewen
Group, hired a search firm to put together a new board of
directors.35 The new board, rather than the Bankruptcy Court, had
the primary authority for deciding what actions will maximize the
value of the firm.36 This is an innovative solution to ensure that
control rights are lodged with those who have the requisite
expertise to exercise them so as to maximize the value of the firm.
While this procedure may not be the appropriate one for every
financially distressed firm, it provides an example of the innovation
29.

See Lynn M. LoPucki & George Triantis, A Systems Approach to

Comparing U.S. and Canadian Reorganization of Financially Distressed
Companies, 35 HARV. INT'L. L.J. 267 (1994).

30. In re Loewen Group Int'l., Inc., No. 99-1244, 2002 U.S. Bankr. LEXIS
199 (Bankr. D. Del. 1999).
31. Id. at *5-*8 (explaining Loewen Group's consolidation and merger
tactics).
32. See E. Bruce Leonard, The Developing Use of Protocols in Major CrossBoarder Filings, 1999 ABI J. LEXIS 140, *6-*8 (1999) (providing a review of
Loewen's cross boarder petition).
33. See Oresteses Pasparakis & Ogilby Renault, Reconciling Chapter 11 with
Restructurings in CanadaRecent Developments in The Loewen Group, Inc., 2002

ABI J. LEXIS 13, *2 (2002).
34. See GILSON, supra note 10 at 25-53.
35. Id.
36.

Id.
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that is occurring in bankruptcy practice today. The general thrust
of these innovations is to cede to market participants asset
allocation decisions, and leave to a court the sorting out of
conflicting claims.
In sum, Professor Ziegel's work reminds us that a modern
enterprise is typically composed of a number of affiliated firms.
This corporate structure tends to reflect conscious financial
planning rather than economic fundamentals. The challenge for
insolvency law, both domestic and transnational, is to sort out the
issues raised while remembering that the first obligation is to do no
harm.

Notes & Observations

